On 28 April 2026, Eugene Cross represented the CPS at the Court of Appeal. The CoA dismissed the Defendant’s appeal against sentence in a fraud case, where financial loss is modest, but victim impact is substantial.
All parties accepted that the offence fell into High Culpability. Although the victim had only been defrauded of £1,500 (the lowest category of harm on the guidelines), the victim was 84 years old and gave a detailed VPS about how the experience continues to impact her over a year after the offence. Based on the financial value alone, the starting point would have been 36 weeks custody.
The appeal concerned a sentence of three years’ immediate custody imposed following conviction after trial. Leave to appeal had been granted on the basis that the sentencing judge was said to have erred in moving up two harm categories because of the impact on the victim, resulting in a starting point of three years’ imprisonment.
On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that moving up two categories was a course reserved for exceptional cases, and that the sentencing judge had failed to provide adequate justification for taking that step.
Responding to the appeal on behalf of the CPS, Eugene submitted that, the Fraud Sentencing Guidelines expressly permit the court to move up more than one harm category where the financial loss is low but the impact on the victim is high. There is no requirement of exceptionality before taking that course. Provided there is no or minimal financial value, and it is a case of high impact, it is a matter of discretion for the sentencing judge as to whether moving up 2 categories is appropriate.
Giving judgment, the Court of Appeal accepted that the central issue was whether the sentencing judge had been entitled in principle to move up two harm categories, notwithstanding that even a single-category movement would have left the sentence imposed within that range.
The Court held that the sentencing judge was uniquely well placed to assess the harm in this case and was entitled to conclude that this was a case where it was appropriate to move up more than one harm category because of the impact on the victim.